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Abstract 
Although legal practitioners recognise the terminology ‘open skies’ there is no one accepted 
definition. The principle aim maybe the same, namely ‘to democratise aviation’ but interpretation 
and practice translates through into variances and divisions as to how liberal nations are willing to 
be. This paper explores the concept and development of ‘open-skies’ with the intention of 
questioning whether this hypothesis is a realistic and an accomplishable objective. 
 This paper commences with a relevant-contextualised, historical exploration of open-skies 
agreements. The development of the US and EU are analysed before the research discusses the on-
going developments in terms of the ‘potential’ of, and ‘difficulties’ in, realising ASEAN-EU and 
ASEAN-US open skies agreement. 
 The findings show the challenges and successes within the global aviation sector as viewed 
from this triangulated approach, and the conclusion drawn is that there remains impediments which 
will be difficult to overcome.  
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1  Introduction 
 
The term ‘open skies’ is arguably a misnomer. Whilst there are no physical borders there are most 
certainly political boundaries, which arguably stem back to a legacy of distrust amongst nations. 
Heritage is often difficult to overcome for air transport services, which remain inherently 
controlled by sovereign ‘state’ dominance. Air transport continues to battle archaic controls in 
terms of foreign investment and ownership rules, and whilst deregulation and liberalisation maybe 
the ‘official’ direction – the skies are certainly far from open and we have yet to see and experience 
democratised aviation with equal freedom of opportunity across the globe.  
Whilst aviation scholars and practioners recognise the terminology ‘open skies,’ there is no one 
accepted definition as to the meaning of this phrase. The principle maybe the same, namely ‘to 
democratise aviation’ but interpretation and practice translates through into variances and divisions 
as to how liberal nations are willing to be. Translating multilateral exchanges of market 
opportunity consistently maybe a desire, but one that has rarely been achieved, with even broader 
plurilateral agreements, such as the Multilateral Agreement on Liberalization of International Air 
Transportation (MALIAT), receiving minimal accession numbers. However, there have been some 
noticeable successes in terms of more liberalised regional and sub-regional agreements with the 
EU clearly showing that, as well as creating an open internal market, the united union of Member 
States is willing to geographically extend this development with external partners to the extent of 
opening up skies and creating Open Aviation Areas.  
This paper explores the concept of ‘open-skies’ with the intention of questioning whether this 
hypothesis is a realistic and an accomplishable objective. The focus of the research centres around 
the concept of open skies, and the partnership agreements of the EU, and the pursuit of ASEAN, 
for regional cooperative agreements. The developments, challenges and successes within the global 
aviation sector in terms of opening up the skies are discussed, as viewed from a triangulated 
approach, and conclusions are drawn as to where the future could potentially lie (Chart 1: 
triangulated approach). 
The research is undertaken primary through the discipline of law, however since the focus is on 
a more liberalised approach to open skies, limited comment is passed on the relations of States, 
which inevitably involves history and politics, alongside the soft law area of policy. There is 
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therefore expository research, combined with substantiated reasoning, and analogical opinions and 
discussion.  
 
Chart 1: Triangulated research approach 
 
                                                                            Source: Authors 
 
 
2  Origins: The Vision for Open Skies 
 
The US was to be instrumental in developing the concept of open skies over a number of years, 
with the origins of open skies also traceable back to the US. In July 1955 the US President, 
Eisenhower, presented his vision of open skies.
3
 The meeting took place in Geneva between 
representatives of the US, France, Great Britain and the Soviet Union. In this instance the 
terminology referred to arms control and in particular the policy concept involved the United 
States and the Soviet Union exchanging information and maps showing the exact location of their 
military installations. Once equipped with this information the notion extended to the other State 
undertaking aerial surveillance to verify and monitor the locations. As history confirms, this plan 
was not accepted by the Soviet Union, with President Khrushchev declaring Eisenhower’s ‘open 
skies’ concept as nothing more than an ‘espionage plot.’ 
 
This vision of open skies may not fall within our current understanding for civil aviation, but 
perhaps there are similarities to factor in nonetheless. Firstly, for the Soviet Union, the idea of US 
planes within their airspace, regardless of the fact that they were there to conduct ‘agreed’ 
                                                        
3
 Summit in Geneva, 21 July 1955. See F.E. Smitha, 2015. ‘Macrohistory and World Timeline: Tensions and Geneva, 
1955’. Retrieved 27 September 2016 www.fsmitha.com/h2/ch24t6.htm. Also see W.W. Rostow, Open Skies 
Eisenhower's Proposal of July 21, 1955 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982), and W. Lambers (ed) "Open Skies" 
for Peace: Contributing to the Development of Peace Worldwide by the Creation of an Open Skies Regime for Aerial 
Observation (Lambers Publications, 2006). 
Open Skies EU-US
(Concluded)
ASEAN-EU (To be
negotiated)
ASEAN-US (To be
negotiated)
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surveillance of military bases, was unthinkable. This was of course inevitably related to the Cold 
War era, but this moreover was reflective and indicative of sovereign nations distrust of other 
global States, and the potential threat of the aircraft in terms of invading or compromising their 
sovereign land and (air) space. Ironically, some months later, this permission proved an 
unnecessary requirement when the US Eisenhower administration approved the use of high-
altitude spy planes (the famous U-2s) for just this spying purpose.  
 This Geneva meeting of course related to the use of aviation directly concerned with military 
activities by State powers, however for civil aviation the underlying concept of distrust and 
sovereign control is also inherently evident and is ultimately a legacy of warfare and political 
relations.
4
 Subsequently, there arguably remains a correlation between the openness and trust of 
Governments, as reflected by military actions and policies, and external policies, which build upon 
such confidence in the trade world. Inevitably assurance and trust is consequently translated and 
transferred into the global arena, which sees more openness and access when trading and providing 
services internationally. Certainly, in theory this has proven to be the case; however, there is also 
evidence that in practice there is a limitation to the ‘trust’ element and that openness remains 
equally subject to borders and competitive advantage.
5
  
 
 
3  Breaking Down Barriers: ‘Stepping Stones’  
 
In 1992 President George Bush did in fact sign the Open Skies Treaty, however rather than 
application to civil aviation, the Treaty established a regime of unarmed aerial observation flights 
over the entire territory of the then agreeing 25 signatories.
6
 In this sense, the Open Skies 
agreement constituted the most extensive international effort, to that time, on openness and 
transparency in relation to military forces and activities. However, the Treaty was not to enter into 
force until 2002. The concept was to promote global confidence and world stability. 
                                                        
4
 S.J. Fox ‘The evolution of aviation in times of war and peace: blood, tears, and salvation’, International Journal of 
World Peace 31(4) (2014) 49-79. 
5
 S.J. Fox, ‘AVIATION: Green and level playing fields? A paradox of virtues: ‘DUMPING’ – Anti-competitiveness!’ 
Aviation: A Risky Business, paper series (forthcoming) 
6
  The Treaty, together with the Annexes, was signed at Helsinki on 24 March, 1992 by The North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization Allies, Eastern European members of the former Warsaw Pact, and Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and 
Georgia. 
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 Civil aviation has continued to bare the brunt of nations’ reluctance to concede control of their 
skies, whether this is solely as a result of a history of a ‘world of warfare’ is arguably questionable. 
Since the end of the Cold War the pace of globalisation has rapidly quickened; and, whilst many 
industries have been subject to a more liberalised approach, welcoming and embracing the 
opportunities afforded through foreign investment and ownership, civil aviation remains subject to 
the reins of government control.
7
 Inevitably there remains a conflict of policies – trade vs. 
sovereign protectionism, security vs. competition, etc.
8
  
 That said, the premise of open skies was to be expanded into civil aviation with key significant 
dates running parallel to the principle of open skies in relation to military activities. 1992 and 2002 
were also to be significant years for civil aviation development. Commencing in 1992, the US 
began to negotiate a series of civil aviation relationships with international partners commencing 
with the first ever Open Skies air services agreement with the Netherlands. This represented an 
important development in the liberalisation of air transport services from the post-Chicago 
restrictive model based on the maxim that, ‘all commercial international air passenger transport 
services are forbidden except to the extent that they are permitted.’9 Whilst it is often viewed that 
the Chicago Convention
10
 created a restrictive economic environment for aviation, specifically air 
service operations, this premise strictly speaking remains inaccurate. As Bartsch
11
 reinforces, 
despite the initial Conference having two main threads, (i) technical and (ii) economical, consensus 
could only be reached in respect to the first objective, in reality, the less controversial strand. 
Hence it was left to individual International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) States and 
therefore political ‘will’ to mutually exchange reciprocal commercial rights through air service 
agreements (ASA’s), which were separately negotiated outside general trade diplomacy and related 
agreements.
12
 In essence, this lack of political ‘will’ arguably created the ‘the most complicated 
field of endeavour ever attempted by man.’13 And, yet, even with these post 1990’s ‘open skies’ 
                                                        
7
 A point continually reinforced by the industry – see for example the remarks of Tony Tyler (IATA) (2013). Royal 
Aeronautical Society Beaumont Lecture Series in London.  
8
 Fox, ‘AVIATION: Green and level playing fields? A paradox of virtues: ‘DUMPING’ – Anti-competitiveness!’ (n 5). 
9
  C. Thaine, ‘The Way Ahead from Memo 2: The Need for More Competition A Better Deal for Europe’, Air Law 10 
(1985) 90, 91.    
10
 Chicago Convention - Convention on International Civil Aviation. ICAO Documents, Doc 7300.   
11
 
 
R.I.C. Bartsch, International Aviation Law: A Practical Guide (London, New York: Routledge, 2012).  
12
 Daniel P. Kaplan, ‘Foreign Investment in Domestic Airlines, in Airline Commission Documents’, Dkt. No. 001018 
(2 July 1993) at 13; S.J. Fox, ‘AVIATION: Green and level playing fields? A paradox of virtues: ‘DUMPING’ – Anti-
competitiveness!’ (n 5). Also see Appendix to this paper which explains each of the nine freedoms (sometimes referred 
to as rights). The use of the freedoms confers entitlements to operate international air services with the scope of the 
bilateral or multilateral air service agreements (ASA).  
13
 M.J. Lester, Review of C. Codral, ‘European Airfares and Transport Services’, European Law Review 8 (1983) 212.  
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agreements – aviation has not experienced the same equality as is to be found in other cross-border 
services. Lykotrafiti
14
 states that ‘[s]eventy years after the signing of the Chicago Convention a 
very different geopolitical, social and economic landscape has emerged.’ Whilst this may certainly 
be true, the reality is that governments are only ‘willing’ to concede what they wish to in order to 
aid their countries trade, whilst still importantly, retaining tight sovereign control over what is still 
regarded as a ‘national asset.’ The comments made by Bartsch, are equally as applicable today as 
they were on reflecting on the atmosphere of the 1944 mid-war Chicago Conference, namely, ‘the 
overarching concern of the majority of the conference delegates was maintaining state 
sovereignty.’15  
 
3.1. Aviation: Clinging onto Sovereignty and Control 
 
Defining a sovereign state in itself remains controversial. The terminology ‘country’ and ‘nation’ 
are words frequently used interchangeably for what political scientists call a ‘sovereign’ state.16 
Historically state boundaries and borders have continued to move and to be challenged, mostly 
due to acts of aggression, revolution and declarations of independence. National sovereignty is 
inherently protected; yet, in a globalised world, recognition is accorded to the fact that cooperation 
and collaboration are essential factors in securing peace and achieving the integration of a world 
society. Aviation should be viewed as a critical component resulting in such global linkage, which 
ultimately enhances and develops the concept of globalisation further, in theory, shrinking the 
world and thus creating international unity. That said, the aspect of international cooperation 
however also risks challenges associated with sovereignty and hence can lead to the manifestation 
of state protectionism. Aviation in particular has witnessed such national reticence to liberalise. 
The skies may, technically, be viewed as ‘borderless’ but the ability to freely fly is often restricted 
by the lack of international cooperation. Just as the skies are protected
17
, so are the airlines that 
utilise the air space – inherently, this stems back to the legacy of sovereign supremacy and control. 
                                                        
14
 A. Lykotrafiti, ‘Liberalisation of international civil aviation – charting the legal flightpath’, Transport Policy 43 
(2015) 85-95. 
15
 Bartsch, International Aviation Law: A Practical Guide (n 11). For more expansive commentary see Fox, 
‘AVIATION: Green and level playing fields? A paradox of virtues: ‘DUMPING’ – Anti-competitiveness!’  (n 5).    
16
 J. Bartelson, ‘The Concept of Law – Revisited’, European Journal of International Law 17(2) (2006) 463-474 
(2006). 
17
 S.J. Fox, ‘Single European Skies: Functional Airspace Blocks – Delays and Responses’, Air and Space Law 41(3) 
(2016) 201–228 (discussion in relation to EU States protecting their airspace, despite the most extensive example of 
liberalisation by the EU of the aviation industry globally). 
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Lykotrafiti
18
 refers to the fact that this principle extends ultimately to ‘economic sovereignty’ and 
has culminated in what she expresses ‘appears to be the main obstacle to liberalisation’ particularly 
pointing to the nationality restrictions embedded within the air services agreements, the capping of 
foreign investment in and the restriction of foreign control of national airlines. Whilst Mendes de 
Leon
19
 argues that the global liberalisation regime of the past two decades has ultimately affected 
the operation of international air transport services also in a more liberalised manner, this has not 
transferred through into the realms of ownership, where little progress has been made in terms of 
the ownership restrictions (substantially owned and effectively controlled limitations). This 
reluctance within a globalised economy to embrace a more liberalised approach, in terms of 
accessing the international capital markets, potentially also identifies the difficulties in terms of 
reaching a consensus as to what open skies actually are, and hence, just how liberal nations are 
willing to be re advancing this concept. 
Mendes de Leon refers to the so-called Ferreira doctrine, whereby traffic rights are intrinsically 
viewed as the ‘estate’ of a state, identifying that any transition from bilateralism to multilateralism 
ultimately requires Member States to move away from the concept of air traffic rights as national 
property, to a more liberalised extrinsic international property basis approach.
20
 In reality this 
should be viewed as more of an ‘ideal’ concept, rather than a realistic and achievable outcome – 
given the continued hesitancy shown even between close allies (such as the EU and US) to 
concede sovereign control and arguably equitable market access. 
 
3.2. Defining ‘Open Skies:’ Civil Aviation 
 
3.2.1. What Do You Mean by ‘Open Skies’? 
 
The International Air Transport Association (IATA) via its IATA Agenda for Freedom
21
 
emphasised that the concept of open skies is to be regarded as a higher degree of commercial 
                                                        
18
 Lykotrafiti, ‘Liberalisation of international civil aviation – charting the legal flightpath’ (n 15). 
19
 P. Mendes de Leon (series editor) within the publication of B.F. Havel, Beyond Open Skies: A New Regime for 
International Aviation (Wolters Kluwer, 2009). 
20
 P. Mendes de Leon, Cabotage in Air Transport Regulation (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1992). 
21
 IATA Agenda for Freedom is a statement of policy principles by several States with an aim to set a more liberal 
guiding principles in the implementation of Air Transport. The multilateral Statement of Policy Principles was signed 
by seven countries of Bahrain, Chile, European Commission, Kuwait, Lebanon, Malaysia, New Zealand, Panama, 
Qatar, Singapore, Switzerland, United Arab Emirates and USA on 16 November 2009 at Montebello, Canada. The 
document was later adopted by ICAO during its 37
th
 Assembly. 
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freedom in the air transport sector, particularly concerning the following aspects: (1) capital 
markets – especially on airlines ownership limitations; (2) number of airlines’ designations by a 
State; (3) traffic rights; (4) pricing; and (5) the needs for fair competition. 
Meanwhile, ICAO applies the following definition in respect to ‘open skies’. Namely, it is  
a type of agreement which, while not uniformly defined by its various advocates, would 
create a regulatory regime that relies chiefly on sustained market competition for the 
achievement of its air services goals and is largely or entirely devoid a priori governmental 
management of access rights, capacity and pricing, while having safe-guards appropriate to 
maintaining the minimum regulation necessary to achieve the goals of agreement.
22
 
 Taking both these explanations together, open skies could be best described as an intention to 
democratise aviation, whilst not being uniform in nature, thus questionably not allowing the full 
aim to be achieved, the process nevertheless, provides a further stepping- stone within the process 
of liberalisation. 
  The US Open Skies current model serves to further evidence this by pointing to the fact that 
one primary objective is the desirability ‘to promote an international aviation system based on 
competition among airlines in the marketplace with minimum government interference and 
regulation;’ whilst furthermore, ‘encouraging individual airlines to develop and implement 
innovative and competitive prices’ so as ‘to facilitate the expansion of international air transport 
opportunities’.23 Therefore, in reality, defining open skies remains problematic because of the 
inconsistencies within the agreements actually drawn up and agreed, and hence, what is to be 
construed as, or in fact recognised as open skies undoubtedly remains uncertain. Therefore, whilst 
the intention maybe to liberalise – so as to achieve a less restrictive environment, the reality is 
somewhat different. 
 
 
4  The US-EU Position and Developments  
 
From 1992 the US has continued to select partners for open skies development and whilst the US 
lists numerous collaborative associates, the 2002 developments in the EU
24
 created the concept of 
                                                        
22
 ICAO. 2004. ‘Manual on the Regulation of International Air Transport’. Doc No. 9626, 2.2-2.  
23
 US Open Skies Agreement model, 12 January. 2012. Retrieved 27 September 2016 
www.state.gov/documents/organization/114970.pdf.  
24
 Ibid, referring to the so-called ‘Open Skies’ judgment of 2002.   
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one EU partner (as distinct from individual States retaining individual policies and in essence their 
own airlines). Significantly the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) ruling marked the 
start of the EU external aviation policy, having added clarity in respect to the distribution of 
powers between the EU and its Member States (MS’s) in the field of the regulation of international 
air services. Up until this point bilateral agreements between States had been concluded on an 
individual (MS’s) basis. In substance, this judgment25 was to emphasise the EU’s advancement to 
the world in the field of liberalised air services, particularly from an internal market perspective. 
The concept of the EU ‘Community Carrier’ had been recognised. 
In 2003
26
 the EU Council of Ministers granted the Commission two mandates (which had 
previously been requested):
27
 
(i) A negotiation mandate with the United States, and 
(ii) A negotiation mandate with all third countries. 
 
4.1.  US-EU Open Skies - Overview 
The composition of the mandates related to the revision of clauses in respect to the ownership and 
control of airline companies and all matters coming under the ‘exclusive external competence of 
the Community,’ and enabled the Commission to negotiate on the basis of the Community's 
economic and political priorities. The negotiations, particularly with the US, were to be a key 
development in the democratisation process for aviation services. Much has been written 
concerning both the 2008
28
 and 2010
29
 EU-US Open Skies agreements.
30
 However, in all reality, 
the EU-US Open Skies negotiations typify the difficulty in actually getting to an agreement stage. 
                                                        
25 
Case C-466/98 Commission v. United Kingdom [2002] ECR I-9427; Case C-467/98 Commission v. Denmark [2002] 
ECR I-9519; Case C-468/98 Commission v. Sweden [2002] ECR I-9575; Case C-469/98 Commission v. Finland 
[2002] ECR I-9627; Case-471/98 Commission v. Belgium [2002] ECR I-9681; Case C-472/98 Commission v. 
Luxembourg [2002] ECR I-9741; Case C-475/98 Commission v. Austria [2002] ECR I-9797; Case C-476/98 
Commission v. Germany, [2002] ECR I-9855. 
 
26
 5 June 2003. 
27
 As within the Communication from the Commission on relations between the Community and third countries in the 
field of air transport. Com 2003/0094. 
28
 The EU-US Air Transport Agreement, signed on 30 April, 2007, applicable from 30 March, 2008.  
29
 Amended by a Protocol, signed and provisionally applied on 24 June 2010. A later amendment in 2011 saw Norway 
and Iceland’s accession to the Air Transport Agreement. 
30
 A. Cosmas, P. Belobaba and W. Swelbar, ‘Framing the Discussion on Regulatory Liberalization: A Stakeholder 
Analysis of Open Skies, Ownership and Control’, MIT International Center for Air Transportation – White Paper. 
International Journal of Aviation Management 1(1/2) (2011) 17-39. K. Done and D. Cameron, 2007. ‘Brussels warns 
US over threat to open skies’. Financial Times, 17 July 2007. J.A. Warden, ‘“Open Skies” at a crossroads: How the 
United States and European Union Should Use the ECJ Transport Cases to Reconstruct the Transatlantic Aviation 
Regime’, Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business 24 (2003-2004) at 227.  
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In the same way as the military counterpart, the discussions occurred over a series of sessions, 
which commenced in 2002 but repeatedly stalled over the following four years
31
 and then beyond 
this time until the compromise was reached in 2007. The main focus on the negotiations was on 
competition, safety, pricing, state aid, the environment, consumer protection, and foreign 
ownership. And, arguably, the primary stumbling block preventing agreement related to cabotage 
(market access) particularly, allowing European airlines to carry passengers and cargo between two 
points within the United States.  
 In this regard it should be noted that the EU had already achieved the most expansive exchange 
of traffic rights in international aviation history through the single aviation market – with all (now 
28) Member States (MS’s) enjoying all nine freedoms32 internally, without restriction (see the 
appendix for an overview).  
 Under the Open Skies template, the sixth and seventh freedoms and not typically exchanged, 
and, in essence, the issue in the US-EU discussions preventing an initial agreement, ultimately 
concerned trade and competitive opportunity, or more accurately perhaps, ‘advantage’ (as viewed, 
by the EU - and particularly the UK) to the US airlines and ultimately to the US economy. 
 The US Department of State, provides the rationale that,  
Open Skies agreements between the United States and other countries expand international 
passenger and cargo flights by eliminating government interference in commercial airline 
decisions about routes, capacity and pricing. This frees carriers to provide more affordable, 
convenient and efficient air service to consumers, promoting increased travel and trade and 
spurring high-quality job opportunity and economic growth. Open Skies policy rejects the 
outmoded practice of highly restrictive air services agreements protecting flag carriers.
33
 
In essence, the stalling in talks, and hence the difficulties in achieving particularly the first 
agreement, actually demonstrates only too clearly the control and interference of governments in 
civil aviation. Whilst the above statement ‘may’ hold true ‘once’ an agreement is achieved – the 
issue remains the degree of government control in the first place. This can clearly be demonstrated 
by the stance taken by the UK in aiding to protect the position of a former flag carrier – ‘reports in 
                                                        
31
 The bilateral summit in June 2004 was also to fail to reach an agreement and negotiations were subsequently halted 
in the run-up to the November 2004 American Presidential Election. 
32
 For an explanation of Freedoms of the Air see: ICAO,  ‘The Manual on the Regulation of International Air 
Transport’, ICAO Doc. 9626, at 4.1-10. Retrieved 27 September 2016 www.icao.int/Pages/freedomsAir.aspx. 
33
 Emphasis added. US Department of Trade website. ‘Open Skies Partnerships: Expanding the Benefits of Freer 
Commercial Aviation’. Retrieved 27 September 2016 www.state.gov/documents/organization/159559.pdf. 
. 
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early 2006 indicated that British Airways was concerned that more than one third of its operating 
profits could be ‘wiped out’ if a deal was agreed, due to the opening up of London Heathrow.’34 
Hence there ultimately remains a conflict in reality, namely, in respect to the overall aim of open 
skies: ‘affordable, convenient and efficient air service to consumers, promoting increased travel 
and trade…. job opportunity and economic growth’ vs. the protection of national airlines, 
particularly former ‘flag carriers,’ local jobs, economic growth. This equates to national (or 
regional) protectionism. 
 The first EU-US although achieving a degree of success was really a ‘limitation’ (or 
compromise) agreement. In the US the agreements was described by Secretary Peters as a ‘historic 
decision’ adding that ‘[t]earing down regulatory barriers allows us to foster more affordable and 
convenient air travel and gives our airline industry more opportunities to compete, innovate and 
thrive;’35 whilst, the UK Transport Committee ultimately referred to the agreement as one of 
‘Unequal Skies.’36 Less than 60 days after the first stage agreement came in to affect, the second 
stage negotiations commenced in May 2008 with the EU identifying several priority areas: further 
liberalisation of traffic rights; additional foreign investment opportunities; effects of environmental 
measures and infrastructure constraints; further access to Government-financed air transportation; 
and   wet-leasing.37 From the US perspective the focus was on broadening the agreement, rather 
than deepening it, by extending its provisions to approximately 60 non-EU countries.
38
 This focus 
on these different priorities inevitably reflects  the different advantages to be gained by each party 
particularly relating to the increase in liberalisation of traffic rights by providing further market 
opportunity into the territory of the other party (or as was the US’s objective, expanding past the 
EU). At the conclusion of the second stage talks whilst ‘an agreement’ had been reached it was 
reported that discussions on two of the key aims would continue, and that they ‘would’ ‘enter into 
effect at a later stage as they are subject to legislative changes on either side,’ namely, ‘[t]he 
reciprocal liberalization of airline ownership and control. ….. [which would] require legislative 
                                                        
34
 As per the ‘Aviation: Open Skies’ report in the House of Commons Library – SN/BT/455. 7 April, 2010, referring to 
the newspaper articles, ‘BA attacks US ‘open skies’ deal’, Financial Times, 19 January 2006; and ‘BA profits at risk 
  if Brussels sacrifices Heathrow for open skies deal’, The Independent, 6 January 2006.’    
35
 Statement by Secretary Peters, 22 March 2007. Retrieved 12 Feb. 2016 www.dot.gov/affairs/peters032207.htm.  
36
 Transport Committee Opinion, published as Annex 1 to: European Scrutiny Committee ‘Fifteenth Report of 
  Session 2006-07’, HC 41-xv, 2 April 2007, 9-11. 
37
 As per Article 21(2) of the first stage Open-Skies agreement. 
38
 L. Butcher, ‘Aviation: Open Skies’, report in the House of Commons Library (2010) SN/BT/455, referring to in 
particular the following sources: ‘Investment at heart of new Open Skies talks,’ Europolitics, May 2008; ‘Open-skies 
talks to focus on US ‘protectionism’, The Sunday Telegraph, 11 May 2008.  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changes in the US’ and ‘[t]he right for EU airlines to fly between the US and a number of non-
European countries (so-called 7th freedom right’).39 
 To date, advancements in respect to these matters have been slow to non-existent and certainly 
the US has not made any legislative changes in over 5 years to facilitate this advancement of 
outside investment and therefore more outside influence. So, whilst the agreement did not go as far 
as the EU had hoped, it did allow airlines to fly without restrictions from any point in the EU to 
any point in the US. The EU however continues to retain the position that the ultimate objective is 
to create a transatlantic Open Aviation Area, in the form of a single air transport market between 
the EU and the US. This would allow for the free flows of investment and have no restrictions on 
air services, including access to the domestic markets of both parties.  
 In contrast the aspects related to safety are in the main far less contentious in open skies 
negotiations with parties having an openly ‘shared’ aim, which is to make aviation safety for the 
benefit of all users, after-all it is in no-ones interest to have unsafe travel which would reflect on 
the airline, the country and the government. 
 
Table 1:  Air Traffic between the EU and US since 2004 
                           (As represented in passenger – millions) 
 
                                                         Source: Eurostat 
 
Since the first Open Skies Agreement the passenger movements between the two nations has 
                                                        
39
 See European Commission, ‘FAQs on The Second Stage EU-US “Open Skies” Agreement and Existing First Stage 
Air Services Agreement’, MEMO/10/103 (2010); and Terry Maxon, 2010. ‘Open Skies deal calls for U.S. to ask 
Congress to allow foreign ownership.’ Dallas News, March. Retrieved 28 September 2016 
www.dallasnews.com/business/airlines/2010/03/25/open-skies-deal-calls-for-us-t. 
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consisted of noticeable peaks and troughs (Table 1: Air Traffic between the EU and US since 
2004). However, since 2012 the trend seems to be more inclined towards constant growth. 
 The EU-US agreements were to be the second of two negotiated multilateral Open Skies accords 
for the US The first one being the 2001 Multilateral Agreement on the Liberalization of 
International Air Transportation (MALIAT) with New Zealand, Singapore, Brunei, and Chile, later 
joined by Samoa, Tonga, and Mongolia. Arguably, MALIAT amounted to little more than a token 
open skies accord, not providing an open investment regime and not facilitating any significant 
form of cross-border regulatory harmonisation. 
 Currently, as at 8 January 2016, the US lists 118 partners to Open Skies agreements.
40
  
 
4.2. The EU – External Aviation Policy 
 
Since 2005 the EU has applied a three-pillar approach to its external aviation policy
41
 (See Table 
2: pictorial pillar system) 
Table 2: The EU ‘three-pillar’ external policy Road Map (based upon the 2005 definition) 
 
Source: Authors (based upon the EU external policy aviation ‘Road Map’) 
 
Summarised, as well as bringing existing bilateral air services agreements, between EU 
                                                        
40
 Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs Washington, DC.  
41
 As defined in 2005 in a Road Map developed by the Council and the European Commission. 
1. Bilateral air service 
agreements 
•Pillar 1: applies the 
'Open Skies' ruling 
through the revision of 
agreements not in line 
with the EU law. This 
ultimately implies the 
amendment of some 
1,500 plus bilateral 
agreements of the 
Member States, so as to 
encompass a more 
liberalised and 
horizontal 'equitable' 
approach 
2. Common Aviation 
Area 
•Pillar 2: is aimed at the 
adoption of agreements 
with neighbouring EU 
partners and the 
progressive opening up 
of markets and the 
phasing in of regulatory 
harmonisation 
3. Aviation 
Agreements with key 
stategic partners 
•Pillar 3: concerns 
agreements negotiated 
by the EU with strategic 
partners and the 
extension of the open 
skies principles (as 
applied within the EU) - 
such as the EU/US 
agreements 
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Member States and third countries,
42
 in line with EU law, the EU has targeted key-specific 
partners, (pillar 3) such as the US, in more expansive collaborative programmes (other focused 
partners have included – Australia, Brazil, Canada and New Zealand). Whilst, the remaining, pillar 
(pillar 2) has been aimed at creating the Common Aviation Area (CAA/also shown as ECAA) with 
neighbouring states, wherein, there has been a gradual opening of the market between the EU and 
its neighbours.
43
 This has resulted in regulatory convergence through the gradual implementation 
of EU aviation rules so as to offer new opportunities both for the EU adjoining nations, operators 
and for consumers. Again this has been a successful and unprecedented approach by a United 
Union (arguably as is, or should equally be the case, for the US – a Union of States) from a US-EU 
comparison perspective, this has only partly been achieved by the US and certainly not at the same 
rate as the EU – potentially because the US is less willing to concede any aspect that would affect 
its trade (from a negative stance to the US that is). For instance, the US announced, only at the end 
of 2015, that it had achieved success with Mexico re advancing a more liberalised approach for 
aviation opportunities between the two adjoining neighbours. On Dec. 18 (2015) it was announced 
that a ‘landmark agreement with one (US perspective) of our largest aviation partners will 
significantly increase future trade and travel between the United States and Mexico…….’ The new 
agreement is said to ‘benefit US and Mexican airlines, travel[l]ers, businesses, airports and 
localities by allowing increased market access for passenger and cargo airlines to fly between any 
city in Mexico and any city in the United States. Cargo carriers will now have expanded 
opportunities to provide service to new destinations that were not available under the current, more 
restrictive agreement.’44 
 This arguably contrasts the more advanced liberalised and progressive approach adopted by the 
EU. The approach taken by the EU is to adopt a relationship with close partners, which allows the 
adoption of the part of the Acquis containing the European aviation rules. In this respect, the 
starting point is safety, which remains the less contentious aspect of ASA’s. The process involves 
                                                        
42
 See for example: Regulation (EC) NO 847/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on 
the negotiation and implementation of air service agreements between Member States and third countries, OJ L 157, 
30 April 2004, 7-17. 
43
 European Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission: A Community aviation policy towards its 
neighbours’. COM(2004) 74 final, 9 February 2004. Also see: ‘Developing the agenda for the Community’s external 
aviation policy’. COM(2005)79 final, 11 March 2005; ‘Communication from the Commission: Common aviation area 
with the Neighbouring Countries by 2010: progress report’. COM/2008/0596 final; Communication from the 
Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, ‘The EU and its neighbouring regions: A renewed approach 
to transport cooperation.’ COM(2011) 415 final, 7 July 2011.  
44
 Air Transport World (ATW Online) Aaron Karp - Liberalized US-Mexico air services agreement signed. Friday, 18 
December 2015 (at 11:56). 
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the gradual opening up of the market by progressive regulatory harmonisation, which is 
implemented by successive phases. The ECAA is implemented through comprehensive air 
transport agreements that promote the overall economic, trade and tourism relations between EU 
neighbours. The parallel objective relates to (as well as safety) promoting fair competition and the 
implementation of common high security, environmental, and other standards. 
 Partners to the ECAA agreements have extended to South-Eastern and Northern Europe, and the 
Western Balkans and include agreements (amongst others) with Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Moldova 
and Morocco. The EU is currently completing negotiations with Ukraine whilst other neighbours 
are/have been party to discussions (e.g. Lebanon, Tunisia and Azerbaijan). Ultimately, ‘the 
prediction is that the wider European Common Aviation Area could encompass up to 50-55 states 
with a total population of up to 1 billion inhabitants.’45 
 Havel
46
 refers to the EU’s initiatives, whereby, the EU seeks to develop liberal multilateral 
ASA’s with selected global partners and neighbours through the ECAA structure, as targeted 
‘aeropolitics’, 47  wherein, the EU is seeking to ‘progressively dismantle the most pernicious 
restrictions of bilateralism, including cabotage and the nationality rule…..’48 In many ways, the 
EU’s approach, certainly with respect to neighbours and selected global partners, could be seen as 
truly intent on liberalisation in the pursuit of democratised aviation; whereas, in contrast, the US is 
reluctant, with even its transatlantic EU partners, to advance nationality and ownership rules as 
well as cabotage, across it’s highly-guarded territory. That said, the reality remains that the level of 
agreements concluded greatly varies in terms of the contents of the contract; and, there remains a 
myriad of entitlements and agreed rights across the world. Even the EU’s focused ‘major’ 
partnerships with key identified nations, differs to varying degrees with the EU-Canadian Air 
Transport Agreement said to be one of the most ambitious to date. In much the same way as the 
EU-US Open Skies agreement, the intention was to allow an increase in investment opportunities 
to an unprecedented level alongside liberalisation of both traffic rights eventually leading to a fully 
Open Aviation Area between the two (based upon the principle of the Internal Market as a free 
open market amongst the 28 Member States, thus completing the concept of openness in the skies). 
                                                        
45
 EU DG Move website. Retrieved 19 January 2016 
https://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/air/international_aviation/external_aviation_policy/neighbourhood_en. 
46
 B.F. Havel, The Principles and Practices of International Aviation Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2014). 
47
 The term being referred to by P.V. Murphy, DOT Acting Assistant Secretary for Policy and International Affairs, in 
his testimony to the Airline Commission, ‘Airline Commission Proceedings’, May 24 1993, 168.    
48
 Ibid at 113-114. 
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(See Table 3: Comparison of OAA and Open Skies). However, the intended progression and 
developments have again not materialised to the ambition initially declared. 
 
Table 3: Comparison of OAA and Open Skies 
Type of 
Agreement  
Freedom 
to set 
fares 
3/4
th
 
Rights 
5
th
 
Rights 
7
th
 
Right 
Cabotage 
8/9
th
 
Rights 
Foreign 
ownership 
and 
control 
Regulatory 
Cooperation 
Open 
Skies 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓Cargo 
✗ PAX 
✗ ✗ ✗ 
OAA - EU 
(Internal) 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
 
Like the US, the EU remains intent on advancing international aviation opportunities, as 
identified in the new EU external aviation policy in which it outlined an ambitious policy targeting 
growth market areas (December 2015
49
). In this regard the EU specifically outlined that it would 
be pursuing negotiations with other key aeronautical partners, notably identifying China and Japan. 
Other identified negotiations were to be conducted with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
States, Turkey, Mexico and Armenia, as well as with ASEAN.   
Alongside this, the EU continues also to bring bilateral agreements in line with the EU concept 
so as to recognise the union as one collective body. By 2015, the EU had concluded 50 Horizontal 
Agreements, which saw modifications to more than 1000 bilateral air services agreements of 
Member States with third countries.
50
 To this end, "national designation" clauses found within the 
bilateral agreements is replaced by "EU designation" clauses. This means that the EU carrier 
established in a particular EU Member State is permitted to fly under the bilateral agreement of 
that EU Member State with a given third country.  
 
                                                        
49
 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions, ‘An Aviation Strategy for Europe’. COM(2015) 598 final, 7 December 
2015.  
50
 Ibid; Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of Regions, ‘An Aviation Strategy for Europe – Commission Staff Working 
Document’. Com (2015)598 Final, 7 December 2015. 
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5 ASEAN 
 
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) consists of ten Member States: Brunei 
(BNR), Cambodia (CAM), Indonesia (INA), Laos (Lao PDR), Mal (Malaysia), Myanmar (MYM), 
Philippines (PHI), Singapore (SIN), Thailand (THA) and Vietnam (VNM). The ASEAN, 
Economic Community (AEC) also recognises the importance of a single market and production 
base for a highly competitive region and recognises that aviation is an important element and 
driver to achieving this.  
 ASEAN has not concluded collective Air Transport Agreements in the same way as Europe has 
(Table 4: US and EU (Horizontal Agreements) with ASEAN States). Conventionally, all air 
transport services between ASEAN Member States still remain governed by restrictive bilateral 
arrangements as a result of strong nationalism sentiments post colonisation. Subsequently, due to 
emerging economics within the region in late 1990’s, several Member States have slowly, yet 
progressively, liberalised their existing bilateral arrangements particularly on matters related to 
market access.
51
 The liberalisation later spread to a sub-regional level
52
 and eventually to 
ASEAN.
53
 In comparison to the liberal arrangements entered into by the EU, ASEAN’s 
liberalisation could be considered a poor relative, and a half-hearted attempt, since ASEAN accord 
                                                        
51
 Malaysia entered into a liberal air traffic rights arrangement with Thailand in 2004 and Singapore in 2009.   
52
 The first ASEAN Transport Ministers Meeting in 1996, Bali, agreed for the Member States to vigorously pursue 
liberalisation of Air transport at a Sub-Regional level. The applicable sub-regional groups are: (1) Brunei, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Philippines, the East ASEAN Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA); (2) Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Vietnam 
(CLMV); (3) Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore – Growth Triangle (IMS-GT); and (4) Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand – 
Growth Triangle (IMT-GT). As a result, effective 2007 airlines were allowed to operate unlimited services up to fifth 
freedom between designated points within the sub-regions. 
52
 In general, the air transport liberalisation in ASEAN can be segmented into three initiatives: (1) The Roadmap for 
the Integration of Air Travel Sectors (RIATS) 2009; (2) Signing of ASEAN Multilateral Agreement for Full 
Liberalisation for Passenger Air Services (MAFLPAS) 2010; and (3) ASEAN Single Aviation Market (ASAM) 2010. 
The 13th ASEAN Summit has endorsed the establishment of ASEAN Single Aviation Market (ASAM) to be effective 
starting in 2015.Unlike MAAS and MAFLPAS, ASAM provides a greater coverage on air transport matters by taking 
the EU and the Australian-New Zealand SAM (unlimited 1st to ninth freedom) as examples. ASAM’s coverage is not 
limited to the economic elements only, but also aimed in harmonising the technical aspects of air transport. ASAM is 
ASEAN’s long-term progressive plan in developing and liberalising the air transport industry with the end result of 
creating a sustainable integrated one ASEAN aviation market to compliment and prosper ASEAN’s economies. 
53
 In general, the air transport liberalisation in ASEAN can be segmented into three initiatives: (1) The Roadmap for 
the Integration of Air Travel Sectors (RIATS) 2009; (2) Signing of ASEAN Multilateral Agreement for Full 
Liberalisation for Passenger Air Services (MAFLPAS) 2010; and (3) ASEAN Single Aviation Market (ASAM) 2010. 
The 13th ASEAN Summit has endorsed the establishment of ASEAN Single Aviation Market (ASAM) to be effective 
starting in 2015.Unlike MAAS and MAFLPAS, ASAM provides a greater coverage on air transport matters by taking 
the EU and the Australian-New Zealand SAM (unlimited 1st to ninth freedom) as examples. ASAM’s coverage is not 
limited to the economic elements only, but also aimed in harmonising the technical aspects of air transport. ASAM is 
ASEAN’s long-term progressive plan in developing and liberalising the air transport industry with the end result of 
creating a sustainable integrated one ASEAN aviation market to compliment and prosper ASEAN’s economies. 
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liberalisation of market access only up to 5th freedom, with seventh, eight and ninth freedom 
traffic rights still considered as off-limit.
54
 Ownership remains a highly sensitive matter for 
limiting liberalisation with the majority of ASEAN Member States indicating strong opposition 
which would prevent controlled airlines operating with equal rights within their territory, 
suggesting that national protection remains the main divider and obstacle over the mutual interest 
of ASEAN’s. Notwithstanding that, ASEAN remains optimistic and open to possibilities of having 
an ASEAN carrier, similar to the EU, in the future.
55
  
 
Table 4: US and EU (Horizontal Agreements) with ASEAN States 
Country US EU 
BNR Open Skies Agreement 20 June 
1997 
Multilateral Agreement 01 May 
2001 
No horizontal agreement 
CAM - No horizontal agreement 
INA US Indonesia Agreement 
24 August 2004
56
 
Initiated 17 August 2009: 
Horizontal Agreement  
LAO US – Laos Air Transport 
Agreement  
(3 October 2008)
57
 
US Signs Open Skies Accord with 
Laos (13 July 2010) 
US – Laos Air Transport 
Agreement of July 13, 2010 (13 
July 2010)
58
 
No horizontal agreement 
MAL US - Malaysian Air Transport 
Agreement (21 June 1997).
59
 
Annex III cancelled (07 August 
2006) 
Horizontal Agreement: 
signed 22 March 2007 
                                                        
54
 S.J. Fox and R. Ismail, ‘ASEAN Open Skies – Aviation Development in 2015: Blue or cloudy skies?’ Annals of Air 
and Space Law Vol. 41 (2016), no. 3 pp. 201-228.  
55
 For example, an ASEAN carrier is visualised as a carrier, which may be owned by an Indonesian, incorporated in 
Brunei, based in Kuala Lumpur and operate unlimited frequencies from Singapore to various destinations in ASEAN 
and beyond. Hence, the visions represent ASEAN’s ultimate definition of liberalisation – a sky that is truly open. 
56
  Air Transport Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the 
Republic of Indonesia. Retrieved 28 September 2016 www.state.gov/documents/organization/114649.pdf. 
57
 US–Laos Air Transport Agreement (3 October 2008). Retrieved 28 September 2016 
www.state.gov/documents/organization/114925.pdf. 
58
 US–Laos Air Transport Agreement 13 July 2010. Retrieved 28 September 2016 
www.state.gov/documents/organization/144979.pdf. 
59
 US-Malaysian Air Transport Agreement 21 June 1997. Retrieved 28 September 2016 
www.state.gov/documents/organization/114289.pdf. 
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MYM US-Burma Air Transport 
Agreement (28 September 1949)  
No horizontal agreement 
PHI US-Philippines Air Transport 
Agreement 3 October 1980 
- US Philippines 1987 
Amendment, 29 May 1987 
- US Philippines 1989 
Amendment, 24 April 1989 
- Philippines Protocol to Air 
Transport Agreement of 20 
November 1995
60
 
 
No horizontal agreement 
SIN Multilateral Agreement on the 
Liberalization of International Air 
Transportation With Singapore 
1 May 2001 
Horizontal Agreement: 
signed 9 June 2006 
THA US – Thailand Air Transport 
Agreement 19 September 2005
61
 
No horizontal agreement 
VNM - US – Vietnam Air Transport 
Agreement 27 August 2004 
- Vietnam Air Transport 
Agreement 
7 October 2008
62
 
- Vietnam Air Transport 
Agreement 
18 May 2010 
- Vietnam Air Transport 
Agreement 
13 December 2012
63
 
Horizontal Agreement: 7 
March 2006 
Source: Authors 
(Information as per the EU and US Dept. of State) 
 
5.1. ASEAN’s Approach with Dialogue Partners 
 
ASEAN was established based on the spirit of recognising the differences of each Member States 
and decisions are therefore made based on mutual consensus. Unlike the EU, centralised power is 
                                                        
60
 Philippines Protocol to Air Transport Agreement of 20 November 1995. Retrieved 28 September 2016 
www.state.gov/documents/organization/114316.pdf. 
61
 US–Thailand Air Transport Agreement. Retrieved 28 September 2016 
www.state.gov/documents/organization/114703.pdf. 
62
 Vietnam Air Transport Agreement 7 October 2010. Retrieved 28 September 2016 
www.state.gov/documents/organization/114920.pdf. 
63
 Vietnam Air Transport Agreement 13 December 2012. Retrieved 28 September 2016 
www.state.gov/documents/organization/202488.pdf. 
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absent within ASEAN, hence ASEAN Member States are so-called not legally-bound to any of 
ASEAN initiatives. The only motivation that drives ASEAN is ‘good faith’ and arguably political 
willingness to prosper each nation in a stable region. Yet, this may also be seen as a limiter to 
concluding agreements due to the inability to achieve political consensus based upon unwillingness 
to lose control of a valuable national asset.  
 That said, ASEAN retains the approach based upon a formulated, and arguably agreed, 
mechanism for approaching Dialogue Partners in pursuit of open skies agreements. Via the 
Memorandum of Understanding on the ASEAN Air Service Engagement with Dialogue Partners, 
signed in 2010, ASEAN Member States have agreed upon the principle of centrality in engaging 
any arrangements with Dialogue Partners. The principle points out the requirement of Member 
States to initially liberalise their respective air services within the region (by ratifying existing 
relevant implementing protocols of ASEAN liberalisation) prior to extending the same right to 
Dialogue Partners.  
 The essence behind this principle is to ensure and maintain maximum and equal benefits among 
ASEAN’s Member States through the creation and establishment of a fair and sustainable air 
transport market within the region. This method also stresses therefore the need to prioritise 
ASEAN amongst the Member States individual political goals and further emphasises the benefit 
of an ASEAN single market.  
 However, the establishment of this ‘Principle’ is also a mechanism which leads to delays, and, 
hence, is a hindrance for achieving the full potential of open skies with Dialogue Partners, as 
Member States are actually not obligated to enter into any ASEAN initiatives, based on the 
ASEAN Minus X Principle.
64
 Hence, States who are not ready to liberalise their markets may opt 
to delay their participation despite having previously indicated their intention to meet deadlines for 
full implementation of an agreement. This is also aggravated by the fact that (unlike the EU) 
ASEAN does not have legal power to enforce any agreed decision lacking also any related court 
mechanism.  
 Upon reaching consensus on this ‘principle’ concept to negotiate, ASEAN started negotiations 
with Dialogue Partners, the first negotiation commencing with China, in 2009. However, during 
the on-going negotiations, ASEAN had yet to conclude the full liberalisation processes intra-
                                                        
64
  Article 21 of ASEAN Charter stipulated that in the implementation of economics commitments, a formula for 
flexible participation, including the ASEAN Minus X formula, may be applied where there is a consensus to do so. 
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ASEAN.
65
 Hence, the first engagement with Dialogue Partners can best be described as pre-
mature. It may also be construed as a covert means to drive and push for a speedy conclusion of 
ASEAN intra-liberalisation agreements (ASEAN Multilateral Agreement of Air Services 
(MAAS)
66
 and ASEAN Multilateral Agreement for Full Liberalisation of Air Services 
(MAFLPAS).
67
 
 
5.2. ASEAN-European Union 
The ASEAN-European Union (EU) dialogue relations were formalised in 1977 during 10th 
ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting
68
 (AMM) which paved the way for formal cooperation and 
relationship between ASEAN and the European Economic Community (EEC). The relation was 
further strengthened via the signing of the ASEAN-EEC Cooperation Agreement in 1980.
69
 The 
dialogue relations have since rapidly grown and expanded to cover a wide range of areas including 
political and security, economic and trade, social and cultural and development cooperation. The 
latter dialogue relations were steered by the 2007 Nuremberg Declaration on an EU-ASEAN 
Enhanced Partnership which sets out long-term vision and commitment of both sides to work 
together for common goals and objectives in the future, indicating the strong and cordial relations 
of both regions.
70
 The EU has for some time been a major development partner of ASEAN and is 
the biggest donor to the ASEAN Secretariat.
 71
  
 
                                                        
65
 Among challenges faced by ASEAN in fully achieving the full benefit of existing liberalisation initiatives are the 
non-readiness of several Member States to ratify the implementing protocols and the ASEAN mechanism of less 
autocracy – wholly based on mutual consensus which provide for leeway to non-participation to agreed economic 
initiatives via ASEAN Minus X Principle. 
66
 MAAS provided for limited liberalisation which was capped at unlimited third, fourth and fifth Freedom Traffic 
Rights between ASEAN capital cities and points designated under ASEAN sub-regional groupings of BIMP-EAGA, 
CLMV and IMT-GT. 
67
 MAFLPAS allows airlines of contracting parties to operate unlimited third, fourth and fifth Freedom Traffic Rights 
for all points in ASEAN. The Agreement also allows for multiple designations as well as a double disapproval regime 
for tariffs to be charged by airlines, support towards fair competition and no restriction on change of gauge. However, 
ownership and control is still bound by the substantial ownership and effective control regime. MAFLPAS and its two 
implementing protocols were signed in 2010 and were aimed to be fully implemented ASEAN-wide by December 
2015 to support the ASEAN Economic Community 2015. 
68
 ASEAN, ‘Joint Communique Of The Tenth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting Singapore, 5-8 July 1977’. Retrieved 28 
September 2016 www.asean.org/?static_post=joint-communique-of-the-tenth-asean-ministerial-meeting-singapore-5-
8-july-1977. 
69
 7 March 1980. 
70
 Council of the European Union, The Nuremberg Declaration on an enhanced EU-ASEAN Partnership, 7588/07 
(Presse 54), 15 March  2007. 
71
 In the budget cycle 2014-2020, the EU will support the ASEAN integration and the Secretariat with EUR 170 
million. This is more than double the amount under the previous cycle (approximately EUR 70 million, 2007-2013). 
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5.2.1. ASEAN-EU Air Transport Cooperation 
 
Air traffic between ASEAN and the EU has been growing steadily in recent years and nearly 
doubled over the last 15 years to reach more than 11 million passengers.
72
 Both direct EU-ASEAN 
traffic, as well as indirect connections via third-country hub airports has seen development since 
the 2005 levels. This translates to a 7 percent growth for direct traffic with actual origin-to-
destination traffic (including both direct and indirect traffic) growing by more than 75 percent 
over this 10-year period.
73
 (Chart 2: Development of the EU-ASEAN market 2005-2015) 
 
Chart 2: EU-ASEAN air transport market development 2005-2015  
 
Source: Com(2015)598 Final
 74
  
In 2013, trade with the EU consisted of 9.8 percent of ASEAN’s total trade with a value of 
248,331.7 million USD and in the same year, tourist from EU made up to 8.8 percent of total 
tourists arriving into ASEAN.
75
 From a European perspective, the combined ASEAN region 
represents the EU’s 3rd largest trading partner outside of Europe.76 With a combined population of 
                                                        
72
 European Commission DG Move, ‘Fact Sheet – International Aviation: an opportunity for growth and jobs in the 
EU aviation sector’, 7 December 2015. 
73
 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of Regions (n 52). 
74
 Ibid. 
75
ASEAN Secretariat, ‘ASEAN Community in Figures Special Edition 2014: A Closer Look at Trade Performance and 
Dependency, and Investment’, October 2014. Retrieved 28 September 
www.asean.org/storage/images/ASEAN_RTK_2014/ACIF_Special_Edition_2014.pdf. 
76
 European Commission DG Move, ‘Fact Sheet – International Aviation: an opportunity for growth and jobs in the 
EU aviation sector’ (n 74). 
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1.1 billion, the ASEAN-EU air transport market is of increasing strategic importance to both 
sides.
77
 
In 2009, ASEAN-EU embarked into their first aviation cooperation through the ASEAN Air 
Transport Integration Project (AATIP) which aimed to contribute towards sustainable ASEAN 
economic growth and integration of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) through the 
development of the civil air transport sector.
78
 AATIP has significantly contributed to the planning 
and implementation of ASEAN Single Aviation Market (SAM) via rendering support to the 
development of harmonised frameworks in aviation safety, security, air traffic management, 
environmental protection, market liberalisation, application of competition laws and economic 
regulations within the ASEAN region. Hence, the EU and ASEAN have already demonstrated 
agreement in technical cooperation.  
 
5.2.1.1.1. ASEAN-EU Open Skies Arrangements 
 
Following AATIP, both sides recognised and stressed the significant potential for further 
cooperation in air transport industry. Hence, during the first ASEAN-EU Summit held in 2014, 
both sides expressed the needs to address a wider range of areas of mutual interest and challenges 
to both regions, which include the intra and inter-regional integration and market liberalisation and 
the prospects for further co-operation between the two regions. At the first EU-ASEAN Aviation 
Summit, held in Singapore on 11-12 February 2014, the EU and ASEAN discussed the possibility 
of negotiating a comprehensive air transport agreement. Two years later it was said that the 
ASEAN-EU pact talks were progressing well – with the intention to create a massive liberalised 
commercial aviation market between the two groups.
79
 
 The EU has actively supported ASEAN's endeavour to establish a single aviation market, 
including through the ASEAN Air Transport Integration Project.  
 
5.2.2.  Analysis on the Possible Impacts of ASEAN-EU Open Skies Arrangements 
                                                        
77
 Ibid. 
78
 ASEAN Air Transport Integration Project (AATIP) – 19th Air Transport Working Group (ATWG) Meeting Working 
Document, Kuala Lumpur, March 2009. 
79
 As reported in ATW Online, Singapore transport minister: ASEAN-EU air pact talks progressing, 14 February 2016. 
Retrieved 15 February 2016 http://atwonline.com/open-skies/singapore-transport-minister-asean-eu-air-pact-talks-
progressing – commenting on the remarks of the Singapore transport Minister Khaw Boon Wan at the Singapore 
Airshow Aviation Leadership Summit (SAALS) in Singapore, 14-15 February, 2016. 
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In general, a liberal market between ASEAN and EU is envisaged to increase connectivity between 
the two regions. However, there is also possibility for the arrangement to be merely another 
aeropolitical move, which only attempts to achieve agreed rights. Moreover, the possibility for 
success is hampered by the fact that, whilst the EU has legal personality and has clarified the 
position in respect to the distribution of powers between the EU and all Member States (in the field 
of the regulation of international air services) ASEAN has a far weaker mechanism based upon a 
principle of faith and political agreement amongst its States. Furthermore such an open skies 
arrangement has arguably not yet been shown to actually be commercially viable.
80
 Hence, the 
benefits derived from ASEAN-EU open skies arrangements will therefore be dependent upon the 
following key criteria:  
(i)  Provision for fifth freedom rights; 
(ii)  Possible provision for sixth to ninth freedom; and 
(iii) Ownership and control of designated airlines. 
Market access for third and fourth freedom is not a major issue for carriers of either region. In 
actual fact, most of the ASEAN and EU major carriers are presently operating direct flights based 
upon the existing bilateral rights. Horizontal EU agreements have in fact only been concluded with 
three of the ASEAN nations (Table 2) namely, Singapore, Malaysia and Vietnam; and even, since 
the conclusion of these, in conformity with the 2002 EU open skies judgement and the EU policy, 
some EU Member States have actually embarked on further liberalising their ‘own’ market 
arrangements with individual ASEAN nations. For example somewhat questionably, the UK after 
the, Horizontal Agreement signed 22 March 2007, between the EU-Malaysia, entered into 
negotiations with Malaysia in order to seek more liberal arrangements between just these two 
countries.
81
 This could be said to be a very dubious approach by the UK in terms of the CJEU 
findings which, its should be recalled, marked the start of an EU external aviation policy for all 
Member States and extended the exclusive competence of the EU in external aviation policy 
negotiations, meaning that an EU State could no longer act in isolation when negotiation 
international air service agreements. Whilst horizontal agreements have the objective to bring the 
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 The ASEAN-China fifth freedom rights are under-utilised due to commercially non-viable factor. This is due to 
designation of secondary points as the fifth freedom rights with lesser market demand as opposed to primary cities. See 
CAPA Center for Aviation. 2014. ‘ASEAN Single Aviation Market: Many Miles to Go’. March 20. Retrieved 28 
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bilateral agreements of all EU Member States with one specific third country into line with EU law 
which means that the Horizontal Agreement between the EU and Malaysia brings the bilateral 
agreements between Malaysia and the other EU Member States into line with EU law. That said, 
the Horizontal Agreements would not affect the volume of air traffic rights or any other provision 
of the respective bilateral agreements of EU Member States with a third country. But what this 
individual MoU actually means in essence is more favourable rights to the UK than to the other 
Member States, thus ultimately making very questionable the whole attempt at creating and 
establishing ASEAN-EU open skies, which may result in less favourable or disadvantageous 
conditions to the UK (in much the same way as was raised in the 2006 negotiations with the US).
 Of course, the recent referendum vote in the UK (23 June 2016) and the potential decision to 
leave the European Union throws into doubt the overall position of the UK with regards to open 
skies agreements conducted as a Member of the EU. Only time will tell whether the UK finds itself 
renegotiating ultimately with ASEAN collectively, or renegotiating once more individually with its 
Members, and of course also the US What should be borne in mind, in this regard, is the fact that 
the UK was viewed very much as a key component in the negotiations between the EU and US in 
terms of more liberalised open skies and access to the European market. If the negotiations 
between the UK and EU were to result in changes to the agreement – this would no doubt be seen 
as a negative development in terms of liberalisation to air services and potentially would risk a 
Bermuda II
82
 (1977) bi-lateral style (or Bermuda two and a half - following some moderations in 
1980) return, or likely a more liberalised updated bi-lateral Bermuda III type of agreement being 
developed.
83
 The very decision of the UK to leave the EU is based upon (whatever the 
justification) ultimately of reclaiming its national sovereignty and hence control of state affairs – 
the irony arguably going against the ‘ideal’ concept earlier discussed, of traffic rights becoming 
more of an international property basis approach. It should also be recalled again with somewhat 
stoicism, that during particularly the second open skies discussions with the US, the UK (along 
with the consensus of the EU States) was supportive of advancing the principle of more foreign 
investment and controlling influence in ‘national’ airlines. 
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 Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of 
the United States of America Concerning Air Services, 28 UST 5367, TIAS No 8641, 23 July 1977 (Bermuda II).  
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From the ASEAN perspective, some of the ASEAN service providers rather than expanding 
services have also in fact been retrenching.
84
 One of the possible explanations of this scenario is 
however, that operations between ASEAN and EU involves long direct flights (more than 10 
hours) which often resulted in low yield due to high operating cost. At the same time, airlines are 
forced to charge a high tariff rate in an attempt to maintain profitable or even a break-even yield, 
which subsequently translates to a risk to load factor performance. As a result, presently, only a 
handful of carriers, majority of which are the legacy airlines, operate direct services between both 
regions. This low connectivity has indirectly facilitated the aggressive penetration of Middle East 
carriers in the ASEAN-EU market, which connects via their strategically located hubs in between 
ASEAN and EU. Turkey therefore also remains strategically positioned to capitalise on this market 
due to its geographical location. The Gulf carriers have also a low tariff advantage, competitive in-
flight services and products as well as moderate flying hours in connecting ASEAN and EU via 
their hubs, and as such they are fast taking the market share for the ASEAN-EU segments. 
Therefore, third and fourth freedom rights alone may not be sufficient to address these issue. 
 Unlimited fifth freedom and sixth freedom rights may provide commercial flexibility for 
airlines of both sides to liberally strategise their commercial operations and subsequently react 
towards the emergence of Middle East carriers in their existing market. The possible fifth freedom 
intermediate points would therefore be points located within the Middle East and South Asia areas. 
As for fifth freedom beyond, ASEAN carriers maybe able to find points within the EU and 
ultimately points within the US as commercially viable locations; and also for the EU’s - points 
within ASEAN may ultimately be strategically advantageous for development within the Chinese, 
Japanese and Hong Kong markets. Open skies between ASEAN and the EU would therefore 
provide room for expansion for the EU carriers, within one of the emerging air transport market, 
particularly in connecting primary cities within ASEAN and beyond, such as Bangkok-Kuala 
Lumpur, Singapore-Denpasar and Dubai-Manila. As for ASEAN carriers, expansion within the EU 
and beyond, via fifth freedom rights, will be commercially ideal, primarily in carrying traffic from 
outside of the EU, even though they may face fierce competition from the EU and particularly 
from third party existing carriers. For example if the EU-ASEAN open skies were to be developed, 
this would no doubt also have an impact on the EU-US market and the open skies agreements in 
North America. Notwithstanding that, the establishment of connectivity to and between secondary 
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cities of both regions, such as London-Kota Bharu or Lyons-Zambonga, just may be prove to be 
unlikely, due to insufficient demand. 
 On top of traffic rights issues, ownership and control is another important aspect, which will 
need to be delicately addressed. That said, this seems someway off given the reluctance of the 
ASEAN Members to advance this matter amongst the ten ASEAN States. In reality ASEAN is far 
from established intra-the ASEAN region and the logical first development would no doubt be the 
creation of an ASEAN carrier. The possible opening market access of permitting carriers which 
has a principle place of business in any of the ASEAN or EU Member States to operate within the 
agreed liberalised market will provide a competitive market which envisages benefits to the end 
users – the customer. Yet, experience has shown, that even amongst so-called close nations, for 
example, the US and EU, the consumer is often forgotten in the equation at the expense of 
protecting the national asset – airlines still perceived to be owned by the government. Advancing 
trade may be the stated objective but retaining control and competitive advantage remains the 
utmost concern. However, such a liberalised provision would also stimulate possible mergers and 
acquisition especially advantageous to smaller airlines. This would lead to the creation of 
domestic/regional feeders to the main carrier, particularly in large domestic market such as 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand. However, the challenge remains the acceptance by ASEAN 
individual States and the EU collectively in accepting this concept, a concept after all that has yet 
to be realised in the more advanced agreements of the US-EU, EU-Canada. In essence, whilst the 
advantages may be seen, the barriers to achieving this cloud the vision. ASEAN Members States in 
particular still have a strong attachment to sentiments of nationalism resulting in ever-stronger 
protectionism for their nations, sometimes at the expense of development, and with some irony 
their own nation. This can be evidenced by the fact that even ASEAN members will still not permit 
mergers and acquisition between the ASEAN carriers yet, despite several initiatives made under 
the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS).
85
 
 It is another factor that the participation of third party carriers, as marketing carriers on any 
routes under this ASEAN-EU open sky, may dilute the original intended impact of providing 
mutual benefits to both ASEAN and EU carriers. However, conversely, it could also be concluded 
that, as most airlines of both regions are members of several alliances, this reasoning maybe 
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negated, as it might award commercial advantage to the operating carriers, especially those airlines 
with limited financial capacity and/or that have other smaller airline responsibility.  
 In essence, given the obvious impediments, the development of an ASEAN-EU agreement for 
open skies seems some way off. ASEAN States in particular need to resolve existing pending 
internal matters, and, ASEAN needs to first fully liberalise its market internally.
86
 Presently, 
Indonesia and Lao PDR have yet to ratify the MAFLPAS, hence there is only partial market access 
within the region. This is an important aspect, particularly given that Indonesia contributes to 
nearly half of the total ASEAN market, based on total airports and population. The disparity of 
ASEAN nations therefore remains an issue. For example, when Singapore is contrasted with 
Indonesia, it becomes notable that demographically there are marked differences, both in terms of 
prosperity and particularly the expanse of their respective networks. Singapore only has one airport 
and hence has little concerns in relation to expanding market access internally. The failure in first 
achieving intra-ASEAN solutions will result in a similar network imbalance in relation to the rights 
obtained from China.
87
 This will ultimately disadvantage ASEAN carriers. Unlike the EU, 
ASEAN’s lack of centralised executive and legislative authority has resulted in ASEAN Member 
States not needing to (i) commit; and, therefore, (ii) being penalised for this lack of adherence to 
‘agreed’ objectives. Despite having the mechanism of engaging Dialogue Partner in place, the 
rationale behind this approach does not serve as a sufficient assurance for ASEAN to fully 
participate as (i) as collective body (ii) to translate the vision through to end results.  
 Additional, ASEAN would also need to ensure that ‘all’ ASEAN carriers were ready to comply 
with all EU’s safety, security and environmental standards. Harmonisation of ASEAN’s own 
safety and security standards, immigration procedures and other related bureaucratic processes, 
will be crucial, firstly, to achieve. Such practices will however be paramount to realise and a 
crucial stage in ultimately ensuring a competitive and accessible environment for carriers of both 
regions. No doubt ASEAN also would need to increase the level of awareness of regional business 
and local community requirements so as maximise the potentially of this regional development 
(ASEAN-EU relationship). And conversely, alongside this, issues of high tax rates imposed by the 
EU may also be an additional challenge for ASEAN carriers. 
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 That said, EU carriers would also have to potentially face competition from the lower tariff 
ASEAN carriers, afforded through generally low labour and other operating cost. The non-standard 
immigration procedures among ASEAN Member States, as it currently stands, would also impose 
additional challenges to EU carriers. However, the EU carriers have the advantage of high demand 
from the ASEAN nations due to increasing tourism and other business development.
88
 
 From an EU perspective, there also remains the aspect of ensuring equality amongst all the EU 
Member States; so as to fully comply with the 2002 CJEU Court judgement. For example, the fact 
remains that not all Horizontal Agreements exist between the EU and all ASEAN States and there 
is also the added aspect of EU Member States still acting in isolation after the very existence of 
Horizontal Agreements (as occurred between the UK and Malaysia), which is arguably not in the 
spirit of an EU liberalised environment, where equal opportunity and market access is shared 
openly amongst all Member States. 
 However, the incentive remains that if ASEAN and the EU are able to reach a consensus on the 
existing unconventional Air Transport Agreements and develop a more liberalised approach 
through open skies that leads to the opening up of, and expansion of mutual traffic rights, together 
with allowing foreign investment into regional air carriers (should ASEAN recognise this prior to 
an EU-ASEAN agreement) - then the potential is that both regions would benefit from increased 
connectivity, plus regaining lost traffic from the Middle-East (Gulf) carriers. That said, there is 
also the risk that if realised, without the US achieving a US-ASEAN agreement, or developing the 
US-EU agreement to include such liberalisation as investment opportunities above the current 
threshold and further expansion of traffic-rights (leading to an Open Aviation Area), then an 
ASEAN-EU Open Skies Agreement would no doubt negatively impact on this favoured 
relationship. 
 
5.3. ASEAN-US 
 
In terms of their approaches with differing foreign States, ASEAN States are unique. ASEAN 
Member States individually imposed strict bilateral regulations with regional neighbours in an 
attempt to limit market access by foreign carriers as part of a protectionism approach. However, 
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the approach is completely opposite with States that are geographically located far away from 
ASEAN. The rationale behind this approach is to encourage connectivity between both States. A 
classic example is the bilateral relationship between ASEAN Member States and the US.  
 
In general, most ASEAN Member States enjoy a liberal market access with the US; Malaysia, for 
example, granted seventh freedom rights to the US carriers. However, it is noted that compared 
regionally these rights are not equally exchanged. Hence, a multilateral approach between ASEAN 
and US would be an advantageous move which serves as a means to address the disparity within 
the existing scenarios. In such an instance both collective parties would also be able to extend talks 
so as to address the ownership issues. 
 In 2015 the US proposed a Senior Transport Official-level dialogue on transportation policy 
issues with ASEAN, initially focusing on aviation issues.
89
 In this regards, ASEAN has expressed 
support to the initiative as a means to enter into dialogue which would serve as an opportunity to 
expand and strengthen the ASEAN-US high-level engagement on important aviation issues. It 
would have to be observed, that prior to doing so, it would be wise for ASEAN to compare the 
existing US-EU open skies arrangements. And, hence, much is also able to be learnt from the 
issues that arose during both extensive periods of negotiations before the first and second stage 
agreements were concluded. However, ASEAN would also need to address any pertinent intra-
ASEAN issues prior to embarking into discussion with the US, much in the same way as it would 
in respect to an ASEAN-EU agreement, for the fact remains that ASEAN still has to iron out 
aspects in terms of the ASEAN liberal internal market – which still stumbles in terms of extending 
full cabotage and considering 100percent investment in carriers within another Member State. 
ASEAN still remains some considerable way off from the EU Open Aviation Area (OAA), fully 
liberalised scenario. 
Commercially, the ASEAN-US open skies would not contribute to a significant increase in 
connectivity. Direct services was still currently impossible due to geographical and technology 
constraints. Hence, the benefit would be on rights beyond fourth freedom especially fifth, seventh, 
eighth and ninth freedom. ASEAN may have no issue in granting these rights, but the challenge 
will be in getting this access into the US. It should be recalled that the EU-US Open Skies 
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Agreement also lacked the ability to invest so as to provide a majority ownership in each others 
airlines. It also did not liberalise to the same level as had initially been envisaged in terms of 
access rights and full cabotage. Both of these had clearly been the aspiration of the EU during the 
talks.
90
 Like access, ownership remains a contentious issue that will need to be addressed if the 
possibility for open skies arrangements between ASEAN and US is to be realised. From an 
ASEAN perspective, since most of the ASEAN Member States will enter into the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership, ASEAN may be willing to relax its ownership limitation with the US but the issue 
remains as to the U.S’s willingness to reciprocate and concede a further percentage, let alone to 
allow majority ownership. Given the current reluctance of the US to advance this with the EU, this 
seems somewhat an unlikely achievement. 
 
 
6   Conclusion 
 
In truth, in would be fair to conclude that open skies serve as a ‘quasi-deregulatory doctrine;’ a 
concept to liberalise, to varying degrees, the restrictiveness of the original restrictive bilateral 
model. Yet, the situation is such that bilaterals are still a majority part of the international trading 
environment for air services. And in reality, inconsistencies remain across the globe, whether due 
to bilateral agreements or the more advanced (plurilateral) open skies natured agreements. The 
requirement within bilateral aviation agreements was that all commercial flights begin and end in 
the carrier’s home territory; however attempts to liberalise access particularly beyond the fourth 
freedom, especially fifth, seventh, eighth and ninth freedom, remains still a challenge, even within 
so-called open skies agreements. Coupled with this, the further impediment remains in respect to 
restructuring the industry and airlines due to an archaic legacy, which restricts (in most cases) the 
majority share ownership to citizenship of that home country. Hence, most bilateral air services 
agreements require that, for an airline to conduct services between the territories of the two 
contracting States, it must be owned and controlled by citizens of the originating State. So despite 
the name attributed to the newer type of agreement which has as the purpose – to open skies, the 
reality is such that extensive limitations remain, even within open skies agreements which are 
perceived to be of a more advanced nature (US-EU, EU-Canada). In essence, the reasons for this 
remains the lack of government ‘willing’ or ‘readiness’ to commit to creating a more liberalised 
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and fully open regime. 
 The referendum vote and subsequent decision by the UK to leave the EU shows just how fragile 
bloc agreements can inevitably be. When one Member decides to leave or renegotiate the terms 
and conditions of its Membership it could inevitably call into question the relationship of existing 
open skies agreements. Certainly, the formulation and framework of the EU would lead to such a 
concern being raised; however, one possible solution in this respect would be to allow the UK to 
participate much as it has done to date in open skies, but under the principle of the ASEAN spirit, 
which embraces the differences of each Member States or participant party.  
 The reins may have been slackened but debatably not to the extent that aviation has become 
democratised. Whilst the purpose of the open skies agreements remains to eliminate governmental 
interference regarding international route rights, the number of designated airlines, capacity, 
frequencies, and types of aircraft that are to be operated on specific routes, there still remains a 
complicated labyrinth of contracts, subject to variation and importantly, still subject to arguably, 
government restrictions.  
 Whilst the EU supranational system has gradually lead to multilateralism and an open aviation 
space for equal and fair competition within the EU internal environment – similar to that of the US 
intra-federal system, the EU and US have not achieved the same anticipated conclusion in their 
own (joint) negotiations for open skies. The Stage II agreement remains some distance yet from 
achieving a more desirable (transatlantic) open aviation area. Therefore, whilst this could be 
achieved, the true pursuit of democratised aviation is inherently hampered by the old nemeses of 
sovereign control and protectionism. As in the same way as the military counterpart of open skies, 
civil aviation advancement remains limited due a ‘distrust’ element and, hence, openness remains 
equally subject to imposed borders which intrinsically create a competitive (trade) advantage to 
those which normally wish such boundaries to remain. As for ASEAN’s negotiations with both the 
EU and US, there remains an obvious stumbling block to the advancement of inter-community 
development under the ASEAN open skies banner – most noticeably the failure/advancement in 
their intra-community negotiations. 
 Although the research has been limited to three primary areas, Europe the US and South East 
Asia (specifically the ASEAN countries) and whilst it is also recognised that there are other major 
players in international aviation services, one primary observations has been that should ASEAN 
and the EU conclude a more liberalised agreement across the current 28 EU States and the 10 
ASEAN nations then there would be likely repercussions to the US-EU agreement. Hence, an 
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ASEAN-EU agreement could actually serve as an incentive for further liberalisation across the 
transatlantic and to this ‘special’ partnership, particularly perhaps in terms of foreign investment. 
Hence again we see the use of aeropolitics. In essence, it would have to be concluded that whilst 
there remains no one firm definition or content for an open skies agreement or even bilateral 
agreement across the globe, developments in one region involving a major group of nations, would 
inevitably lead to further changes and counter-active approaches – which invariably would be 
applied as a means to protect ‘regional’ (joined) nations. Open skies remain only as liberalised as is 
competitively advantageous to that country or regional nation.  
 
 
*** 
 
 
Appendix 
 
 
‘Freedoms of the Air’ - explained 
The first five Freedoms of the Air were annexed to the Chicago Convention, in the form of two 
Agreements – and hence, did not form part of the main Convention on International Civil Aviation 
(Convention on International Civil Aviation, opened for signature 7 December 1944. Chicago. 61 
Stat. 1180, 15 UNTS 295 - entered into force 7 April 1947) 
 
The International Air Services Transit Agreement  
The International Air Services Transit Agreement refers to two freedoms, which are deemed to be 
of a basic/technical nature, namely:  
First Freedom of the Air: the right/privilege, granted by one state to another state, to fly across its 
territory without landing;  
Second Freedom of the Air: the right/privilege to land for non-traffic purposes.  
Due to the nature of these 1
st
 and 2
nd
 Freedoms, most States at the 1944 Chicago Conference were 
content to endorse these privileges. These are replicated in the second of the Agreements, which 
sees the introduction of three further privileges of a commercial nature. 
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The International Air Transport Agreement  
Third Freedom of the Air: the right/privilege granted by one state to another, to put down, in the 
territory of the first, traffic (passengers, cargo, and mail) which comes from the home state of the 
carrier;  
Fourth Freedom of the Air: the right/privilege granted by one state to another to take on, in the 
territory of the first, traffic destined for the home state of the carrier;  
Fifth Freedom of the Air: the right/privilege granted by one state to another, to put down and to 
take on, in the territory of the first state, traffic coming from or destined to a third state.  
 
Note: There are other freedoms of the air, which have not been added to the Convention annexes 
and as such, some remain disputed or unaccepted.  
ICAO characterises all ‘freedoms’ beyond the Fifth as ‘so-called’ because of this, and hence, only 
the first five ‘freedoms’ have been officially recognised as such by international treaty. 
 
These are: 
- The Sixth Freedom: whereby an airline has the right to carry traffic between two foreign 
States, via its own State. This is therefore considered a combination of the third and fourth 
freedoms.  
- The Seventh Freedom: permits an airline operating air service (entirely outside the territory 
of the State of registry) to fly into the territory of another State and there discharge, or take 
on-board, traffic coming from or destined for, a third State or States. 
- The so-called Eighth Freedom of the Air. This refers to the scheduled international air 
services, ‘of transporting cabotage traffic between two point in the territory of the granting 
State on a service which originates or terminates in the home country of the foreign carrier 
or (in connection with the so-called Seventh Freedom of the Air) outside the territory of the 
granting State (also known as Eighth Freedom Rights or “consecutive cabotage”).’91 
 
Abeyrante describes the ninth freedom as: 
- ‘The right or privilege of transporting cabotage traffic of the granting State on a service 
performed entirely within the territory of the granting State.’ This is also known as ‘stand-
alone’ cabotage. 
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